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Abstract
Since 1986 dividend imputation has inﬂuenced the ex-dividend day
behaviour of Australian share prices. Between 1 April 1986 and 30
May 2004 the Government of the day introduced six major legislative
amendments intent on improving the eﬃciency of the dividend impu-
tation system. This paper explores the impact of dividend imputation,
in its various forms, on ex-dividend share price adjustments. We ﬁnd
that only the most recent tax change, which provided full income re-
bates for unused franking credits, appears to have caused the market
to put a statistically signiﬁcant value on franking credits.
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1 Introduction
The theory of arbitrage predicts that in perfect capital markets, with no
transactions costs and no dividend imputation, the expected reduction in the
price of a share on its ex-dividend day should equal the amount of the cash
dividend. Under dividend imputation, shareholders receive a gross dividend,
which is the cash dividend plus a franking credit, where the franking credit
has the value of tax already paid on that income at the company level.
It follows that in perfect capital markets with no transactions costs, the
expected ex-dividend day share price drop-oﬀ should equal the size of the
gross dividend. However, many studies have observed a price drop less than
the size of the gross dividend (e.g., Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986); Karpoﬀ
and Walking (1988) and Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984)) and a variety of
diﬀerent theories have been proposed to explain this ineﬃcient pricing (e.g.,
Heath and Jarrow (1988) and Michaely and Vila (1996)).
Australia has been operating under a dividend imputation system since
1986. In this context it has been suggested that ineﬃcient pricing may be
due to franking credits being undervalued which, perhaps, was the motivation
behind the implementation of six substantial tax regime changes between 1
April 1986 and 30 May 2004. These tax regime changes are discussed in
Appendix A.
This paper considers the impact of cash dividends and franking credits on
ex-dividend share price adjustments for companies and trusts whose primary
listing is on the Australian Stock Exchange. We examine whether share prices
adjust eﬃciently to reﬂect the full after-tax value of the gross dividend and
discuss reasons why eﬃcient pricing may not emerge, with a particular focus
on the impact of the various tax regime changes on the valuation of franking
credits.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the basic model and surveys the relevant literature on dividend drop-
oﬀ eﬀects. Section 3 provides the empirical speciﬁcations that we use to
estimate dividend drop-oﬀ eﬀects and develops various hypotheses that we
subsequently explore. Results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5
concludes.
2 Theoretical Foundations
Our basic model builds on the seminal paper of Elton and Gruber (1970) and,
like them, we shall assume that there is no stochastic uncertainty, that the
costs of delaying or accelerating transactions (foregone interest) are ignored,
and that transactions costs are zero. Under dividend imputation the natural
focus of attention is the gross dividend, being the sum of the cash dividendMarket Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 2







where D denotes the cash dividend per share, s denotes the proportion of div-
idend upon which Australian tax has been paid, and Tc denotes the company
tax rate. The gross dividend, G, is then







Economic eﬃciency requires that there is no opportunity to arbitrage
between the cum-dividend and ex-dividend share prices, denoted Pc and Px,
respectively. So proﬁt from selling a stock cum-dividend (πc), must equal
proﬁt from selling the same stock ex-dividend (πx).1 Letting P0 denote the
price per share at which the share was purchased, Td the tax rate on ordinary
income (including dividends), and Tg the tax rate on capital gains, we see
that
πc = Pc − Tg (Pc − P0)
and






− Tg (Px − P0) .
Therefore the no-arbitrage condition is






− Tg (Px − P0) . (1)
Rearranging this equation, we can deﬁne the gross drop-oﬀ ratio (GDOR) to








There are two competing predictions from this model as to the expected
behaviour of ex-dividend share price adjustments. The short-term trading
1A similar analysis could be followed using the condition that the cost of buying the
stock cum dividend (share price less the dividend net of income tax) equals the cost of
buying ex dividend (share price plus the present value of additional capital gains payable).
Under our assumptions the results will be identical.
2Equally we can deﬁne a cash drop-oﬀ ratio (CDOR) as the ratio of the price change












.Market Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 3
hypothesis says that the ex-dividend event is dominated by short-term arbi-
trageurs whose short-term trading gains are taxed in the same way as divi-
dend income. These arbitrageurs engage in trade around the ex-dividend day
until the fall in the share price equals the size of the dividend, i.e. Td = Tg
and GDOR = 1. Conversely, the long-term trading hypothesis says that the
ex-dividend event is dominated by long-term traders whose dividend income
is taxed more heavily than capital gains, i.e., Td > Tg and so GDOR < 1. For
these traders, capital gains are valued more highly than dividends, and con-
sequently the ex-dividend price drop-oﬀ is less than the size of the dividend.
The relative merits of these two predictions must be determined empirically.
The rest of this section explores the existing literature.
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) argued that dividend imputation sys-
tems increase the value of dividends relative to capital gains, which is specif-
ically relevant to analyzing the long-term trading hypothesis. They esti-
mated Canadian drop-oﬀ ratios before and after Canada’s 1971 imputation
tax reform. Despite an increase in the value of dividends relative to capital
gains, they observed a permanent decrease in drop-oﬀ ratios following the
tax change, contradicting the predictions of the long-term trading hypoth-
esis, although some have argued that this result can be explained by their
treatment of small dividend payments (see, for example, Booth and John-
ston, 1984). Poterba and Summers (1984) examined the behaviour of UK
drop-oﬀ ratios before and after the introduction of a partial imputation sys-
tem in 1973. They noted a permanent increase in the drop-oﬀ ratio after the
introduction of partial imputation, which was consistent with the long-term
trading hypothesis.
Brown and Walter (1986) provided the ﬁrst Australian study of the ex-
dividend day behaviour of share prices.3 Analyzing dividend events from
1973 to 1985, they reported an average drop-oﬀ ratio of 0.75, which was sig-
niﬁcantly less than unity. Although their results were consistent with the
long term-trading hypothesis, they were hesitant to attribute this drop-oﬀ
ratio to a tax diﬀerential. Instead they discussed the possible eﬀect of insti-
tutional factors and transactions costs. Wood (1991) extended their ﬁndings,
looking speciﬁcally at whether there was evidence to support the short-term
trading hypothesis in Australian markets by examining the behaviour of ar-
bitrageurs around the ex-dividend day, and concluded that arbitrage activity
did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the average drop-oﬀ ratios.
Brown and Clarke (1993) analyzed the ex-dividend day behaviour of Aus-
tralian share prices from 1973 to 1991. They estimated yearly average drop-
oﬀ ratios on the ex-dividend day. To allow for the fact that some stocks
are thinly traded and the market may not clear in a single day, they also
estimated drop-oﬀ ratios over the period four days before the ex-dividend
day to four days after the ex-dividend day. They observed drop-oﬀ ratios
signiﬁcantly less than one using both one day and four days either side of
3Note that Brown and Walter (1986) only consider cash dividends.Market Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 4
the ex-dividend event.
Brown and Clarke then examined the eﬀect on drop-oﬀ ratios of the tax
changes implemented during their sample period, with the most signiﬁcant
tax change being the implementation of a dividend imputation tax system
in 1987. The dividend imputation system increased the value of dividends
relative to capital gains, thus making dividends more attractive to investors.
They predicted that this would lead to an increase in drop-oﬀ ratios but they
found instead that drop-oﬀ ratios initially decreased after the introduction of
the dividend imputation system, the same result observed by Lakonishok and
Vermaelen (1983) in the Canadian data. They also observed a slight increase
in drop-oﬀ ratios at the end of the sample, which led to the suggestion that
the initial decrease was due to uncertainty about the value and eﬀect of
franking credits.
Several Australian studies have built upon Brown and Clarke (1993). Bel-
lamy (1994) found that stocks paying franked dividends have signiﬁcantly
higher average cash drop-oﬀ ratios (0.89) than stocks paying unfranked div-
idends (0.66). This is consistent with the idea that shareholders were at-
tributing at least some value to the embedded franking credits.4 Walker
and Partington (1999) estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratios using data on contem-
poraneous cum-dividend and ex-dividend trades. That is, they calculated
gross drop-oﬀ ratios using a sample of stocks that traded both cum-dividend
and ex-dividend on the ex-dividend day on the grounds that such a data set
would ﬁlter out noise caused by movements in the market and movements
in individual stocks. They reported an average gross drop-oﬀ ratio of 1.23
for stocks paying fully franked dividends. Their estimates were signiﬁcantly
higher than those observed previously in the literature, but there is an argu-
ment that these estimates cannot be meaningfully compared to other studies.
The market for cum-dividend shares traded on the ex-dividend day is usually
very small, as evidenced by low trading volumes, and these markets are likely
to be aﬀected by speciﬁc clientele eﬀects. In particular, the participants in
these markets are typically stockbrokers, who are usually in the market only
to facilitate clearing and settlement obligations with other brokers. More-
over, shares trading cum-dividend on the ex-dividend day are overwhelmingly
high yield stocks, so the sample is not representative. Therefore, the esti-
mates obtained using data from these markets may not be a useful reﬂection
of relevant behaviour.
More recent literature has seen the tentative development of alternative
hypotheses to explain why share prices fall less than the dividend amounts
during the ex-dividend period. These new theories reject the long-term trad-
ing hypothesis and instead focus on market microstructure arguments. Bali
and Hite (1998) argued that drop-oﬀ ratios are aﬀected by the discreteness
of stock prices. They suggested that the rounding down of prices causes the
share price to fall by less than the size of the dividend. Alternatively, Frank
4For similar discussion, see Hathaway and Oﬃcer (1992).Market Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 5
and Jangannathan (1998) argued that because most traders are individual
long-term traders and most transactions occur at the ask price cum-dividend
and the bid price ex-dividend, the imbalance in transactions will cause the
price to fall by less than size of the dividend.
Despite the development of these microstructure arguments, subsequent
studies have supported the long-term trading hypothesis. Green and Ry-
dqvist (1999) estimated drop-oﬀ ratios using Swedish lottery bonds, observ-
ing average drop-oﬀ ratios less than one. Similarly, Milonas, Travlos, Xiao,
and Tan (2002) estimated drop-oﬀ ratios for taxable and non-taxable divi-
dends in the Chinese stock market and reported results consistent with the
long-term trading hypothesis. Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003) revisited the
earlier work of Elton and Gruber (1970) using data on closed-end managed
investment funds. They rejected the market microstructure arguments, and
using their selective sample, concluded that the ex-dividend day drop-oﬀ was
most consistent with the long-term trading hypothesis.
Bellamy and Gray (2004) considered the statistical issues of isolating
the eﬀect of the cash dividend and franking credit in the context of Aus-
tralian data for the period 1995-2002. They focused on the high degree of
multicollinearity in the data between the cash dividend and the franking
credit. These two variables would be perfectly collinear except for instances
of changes in corporate tax rates, instances where untaxed income is dis-
tributed such as from listed property trusts, and instances of foreign sourced
company income that does not attract a tax credit for foreign paid taxes.
They considered the eﬀect of only one tax regime change, the 45 day change
in 1997, and found that the gross drop-oﬀ ratio moved in the opposite direc-
tion to their prediction. This led them to conclude that cash dividends are
fully valued and franking credits have zero value to the marginal investor.
This paper builds on these previous studies of ex-dividend day behaviour.
Using a data set covering Australian listed securities from 1986 to 2004, this
paper extends the literature by analyzing the impact of the six important
tax regime changes, and by exploring how the market values dividends and
their associated franking credits.
3 Empirical Speciﬁcations
In the long run we would expect the no-arbitrage condition (1) to hold but
the impact of new information coming into the market, coupled with arbi-
trageurs inability to perfectly foresee this new information, means that for
any dividend event it is only likely to hold with error. A useful representation
of this situation is
Pc,i − Px,i = β0 + β1Gi + i, i = 1,...,n, (3)
where i is an index of the dividend event, n is the number of sample ob-
servations, and the short- and long-term trading hypotheses correspond toMarket Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 6
β1 = 1 and β1 < 1, respectively, where β1 is the GDOR.5 Observe that
the standard assumption in the dividend drop-oﬀ ratio literature is to treat
the cum-dividend price Pc,i as a ﬁxed regressor; see, for example, Brown and
Clarke (1993) and Bellamy (1994).6
Models of the form (3) are typically troubled by the presence of het-
eroskedasticity and that is true in our data as well. One response to this
problem is, of course, to simply estimate the model by OLS and to ‘white-
wash’ the associated standard errors (White, 1980). Alternatively, one might
also postulate a model for the variance of i, σ2
i and use an asymptotically
more eﬃcient feasible GLS (FGLS) estimator. Two examples encountered
in the literature are σ2
i = σ2G2
i (Brown and Walter, 1986) and σ2
i = σ2P 2
c,i
(Brown and Clarke, 1993). The approach adopted here is in a similar spirit
with the FGLS estimator using weights from the auxiliary regression
lnˆ 
2
i = λ0 + λ1Wi + λ2Gi + λ3Pc,i + ui ,
where the ˆ i are OLS residuals from (3) and Wi is company size measured by
market capitalization as a proportion of the All Ordinaries Index.7 This latter
variable is included to reﬂect the fact that larger companies are generally
more frequently traded and operate across more diversiﬁed lines of business,
consequently they may have lower variance in their disturbance terms.
The model of equation (3) assumes that the cash dividend and the asso-
ciated franking credit can be combined as a single gross dividend variable,
G. However, there are reasons to suspect the market may not value equally
a dollar of cash dividend and a dollar of franking credit. For example, some
large classes of institutional investors, such as superannuation funds and for-
eign investors have limited ability to access Australian franking credits, and
as a result these investors value franking credits less than cash dividends.
Furthermore, up until 2000, investors were not entitled to an income tax
rebate for unused franking credits. This meant that franking credits held no
value once they exceeded an investor’s tax liability, and were therefore less
valuable than the cash dividend. To allow for diﬀerential market valuation
of cash dividends and franking credits, we shall expand (3) to
Pc,i − Px,i = γ0 + γ1Di + γ2Fi + i, i = 1,...,n. (4)
5There is, throughout this literature, an implicit assumption that β0 = 0.
6Aggregate movements up and down in the market are an element of noise in the data
that must be taken into account; see, for example, Miller and Scholes (1982). This is done







x,i is the observed ex-dividend day share price and RIx,i is the rate of return on
the All Ordinaries Index over the ex-dividend day.
7This generic model for the disturbance variance is also used with models discussed
subsequently.Market Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 7
Table 1: Summary of the Expected Eﬀects of Tax Regime Changes
Date∗ Eﬀect of Tax Change Likely
Relative to Previous Regime Implications
1988 Superannuation funds can use
franking credits
β1, γ2 both larger
1990 Provisions to stop dividend
streaming
β1, γ2 both smaller
1991 Limits to life assurance funds use
of franking credits
β1, γ2 both smaller
1997 Provisions limiting related pay-
ments, holding period and delta
hedge
β1, γ2 both smaller
1999 Capital gains tax reduced β1 smaller
2000 Tax rebate for unused franking
credits
β1, γ2 both larger
∗Tax regime changes occur at 1 July in the speciﬁed years.
We will term γ1 the cash drop-oﬀ ratio and γ2 the franking credit drop-oﬀ
ratio. In every instance γ0 was found to be insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
at the 5% level.
If the dividend imputation system is fully eﬀective at crediting ﬁnal in-
vestors with the value of income tax paid at the company level, then cash
dividends and franking credits will be equally valued. This proposition can
be examined by the testing the hypothesis that γ1 = γ2. Indeed a rejection
of this hypothesis suggests that the models based on gross drop-oﬀ ratios,
as found in much of the literature, do not produce accurate estimates of the
relative values of cash dividends and franking credits. Furthermore, if this
hypothesis is rejected, then the separate drop-oﬀ eﬀects of cash dividends
and franking credits must also be considered. The proposition that cash div-
idends are fully valued can be examined by testing whether γ1 = 1, and the
proposition that franking credits are fully valued can be examined by testing
whether γ2 = 1. If the hypothesis that γ1 = γ2 is not rejected, then the
short-term trading hypothesis can be retested against the long term-trading
hypothesis by testing whether γ1 = γ2 = 1.
As we mentioned above, there are reasons why franking credits may not be
fully valued. Therefore it is also useful to test a stronger proposition about
the value of franking credits, namely that the marginal investor places no
value on franking credits, which can be examined by testing whether γ2 = 0.
With this framework in mind, recall that we are interested in examining
the eﬀects of the tax regime changes described in Appendix A. The likely
impacts of these changes on the coeﬃcients of models (3) and (4) are sum-
marized in Table 1. In order to allow for these potential structural breaksMarket Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 8
we shall extend our models to take the form
Pc,i − Px,i = β0 +
7 X
j=1
β1,j di,j Gi + i, i = 1,...,n, (5)
and
Pc,i − Px,i = γ0 +
7 X
j=1
γ1,j di,j Di +
7 X
j=1
γ2,j di,j Fi + i, i = 1,...,n, (6)
respectively, where j = 1,...,7 indicates the tax regime in accordance with
the scheme in Table 5 and
di,j =
(
1, if observation i occurs during tax regime j,
0, otherwise.
4 Results
All of the data used in this study was collected from the CommSec Share
Portfolio database. The sample period is 1 April 1986 to 10 May 2004. Sum-
mary statistics, along with discussion of data manipulation, are presented in
Appendix B.
Our results are reported as follows. Section 4.1 analyses estimated yearly
gross drop-oﬀ ratios, cash drop-oﬀ ratios, and franking credit drop-oﬀ ratios.8
Results are discussed in the context of hypotheses developed in the previous
section in respect of equations (3) and (4). That is, our focus is on the
respective valuations of cash dividends and franking credits. Section 4.2
builds on the conclusions of Section 4.1 and considers whether there were
structural breaks caused by tax regime changes, and whether these results
are consistent with the hypotheses and predictions summarized in Table 1.
4.1 Interpretation of Estimated Drop-oﬀ Ratios
The discussion begins with estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratios, with the results
summarized in Table 2 and Figure 1.9 Table 2 is comprised of three panels
of the estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratios together with their estimates standard
errors. The ﬁrst panel of estimates is based on all dividend events in the data
set. Data are then segmented into two sub-samples, a sub-sample of dividend
events where no franking credits are paid and a sub-sample that contains only
partially or fully franked dividends. These results are reported in the second
and third panels of Table 2. Figure 1 plots the estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratios
8Sample sizes for these various subsets of the data are given in Table 8.
9In reporting results, the year in the tables refers to the ﬁnancial year ending 30th
June. For example, 1996 refers to the ﬁnancial year ending 30th June 1996.Market Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 9
Table 2: Estimated Gross Drop-oﬀ Ratios
Year Ended All Dividends Unfranked Dividends Franked Dividends
30 June ˆ β s.e.(ˆ β1) ˆ β1 s.e.(ˆ β1) ˆ β1 s.e.(ˆ β1)
1986 0.600* 0.155 0.600* 0.155
1987 0.520* 0.176 0.517* 0.181 †
1988 0.479* 0.109 0.561* 0.183 0.473* 0.130
1989 0.433* 0.063 0.432* 0.127 0.460* 0.072
1990 0.628* 0.048 0.249 0.258 0.698* 0.045
1991 0.574* 0.048 0.782 0.164 0.614* 0.052
1992 0.537* 0.061 0.871 0.117 0.554* 0.068
1993 0.618* 0.052 0.983 0.196 0.640* 0.062
1994 0.464* 0.062 0.689 0.224 0.442* 0.071
1995 0.561* 0.046 0.811 0.123 0.612* 0.054
1996 0.633* 0.040 0.994 0.117 0.656* 0.046
1997 0.654* 0.045 0.770 0.164 0.697* 0.051
1998 0.705* 0.066 0.707 0.200 0.777* 0.076
1999 0.703* 0.059 0.681 0.148 0.738* 0.074
2000 0.611* 0.051 0.720 0.197 0.659* 0.066
2001 0.699* 0.062 0.658 0.200 0.731* 0.069
2002 0.778* 0.071 0.742 0.157 0.861* 0.077
2003 0.704* 0.041 0.690 0.148 0.743* 0.045
2004 0.753* 0.039 0.385* 0.095 0.788* 0.042
* indicates signiﬁcantly less than unity at the 5% level.
† The sub-sample of franked dividends in 1987 was not large enough to estimate the
drop-oﬀ ratio separately for this sub-sample.
for each of the three samples. Using data for all dividends in the sample,
we see that, for each year in the sample, estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratios are
signiﬁcantly less than unity. This is evidence that long-term traders, who
are taxed more heavily on dividend income than on capital gains, dominate
the ex-dividend day market-pricing event. Furthermore, it suggests that
marginal investors do not trade up to the point where all arbitrage proﬁts
are extracted from the theoretical value of the gross dividend.
Looking at the sub-sample that contains only franked dividends, a simi-
lar story emerges, with estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratios signiﬁcantly less than
unity for each year of the sample. Moreover, the estimated gross drop-oﬀ
ratios for this sub-sample are very close to those estimated for the complete
sample, which is not surprising as stocks paying franked dividends numeri-
cally dominate the complete sample.
For the sub-sample of unfranked dividends, estimated gross drop-oﬀ ra-
tios, which for this sample are the same as cash drop-oﬀ ratios, are not
signiﬁcantly less than unity in the period 1990-2003. This suggests that
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Table 3: Estimated Cash and Franking Credit Drop-oﬀ Ratios
Year Ended All Dividends
30 June γ1 s.e.(γ1) γ2 s.e.(γ2) P1 P2
1987 0.514* 0.177 0.691 0.579 0.594 0.016
1988 0.582* 0.151 0.248* 0.236 0.000
1989 0.569* 0.092 0.188* 0.140 0.000
1990 0.876 0.131 0.215* 0.175 0.000
1991 0.892 0.110 0.092* 0.154 0.000
1992 0.912 0.092 −0.088∗ 0.140 0.000
1993 1.104 0.132 −0.099∗ 0.176 0.000
1994 0.526* 0.151 0.366* 0.197 0.002
1995 0.923 0.098 −0.038∗ 0.155 0.000
1996 0.874 0.102 0.231* 0.158 0.000
1997 0.943 0.110 0.197* 0.168 0.000
1998 0.818 0.138 0.509*# 0.222 0.028
1999 0.848 0.118 0.440*# 0.188 0.003
2000 0.843 0.113 0.242* 0.187 0.000
2001 0.817 0.131 0.506* 0.233 0.035
2002 0.769 0.128 0.732*# 0.284 0.345 0.004
2003 0.728* 0.093 0.678# 0.193 0.097 0.000
2004 0.811 0.108 0.631# 0.229 0.109 0.000
* indicates signiﬁcantly less than unity at 5% level.
# indicates signiﬁcantly greater than zero at 5% level.
P1 is the p-value from the F-test of H0 : γ1 = γ2.
P2 is the p-value for the F-test of γ0 = 0,γ1 = γ2 = 1, given γ1 = γ2.
up to the point where all potential arbitrage proﬁts are extracted from the
ex-dividend event.10 The diﬀerences between the estimates of β1 for franked
and unfranked dividends provides evidence that markets do not fully value
the franking credit component of dividends.
Segmentation of the sample is just one way to address the issue of how
the market assigns value to franking credits. As discussed in Section 3, an
alternative approach is to separate the cash and franking credit components
of the gross dividend as modelled in (4). The results of FGLS estimation
of (4) over the complete sample of dividends are reported in Table 3 and
Figure 2.
In the ﬁrst year of imputation, 1987, and in the years following the intro-
duction of a tax rebate for unused franking credits, 2002 to 2004, the drop-oﬀ
ratios for the cash dividend and for the franking credit were not signiﬁcantly
10One might speculate that this is going to be an attractive strategy in a thin market
where any volume of trade will tend to shift the price, although this remains a topic for
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diﬀerent from each other. This suggests that, at least in those periods, in-
vestors equally valued cash dividends and franking credits. However, the null
hypothesis that these coeﬃcients are jointly equal to one (γ1 = γ2 = 1) is re-
jected, providing further evidence that marginal investors do not trade up to
the point where all excess arbitrage proﬁts are extracted from the theoretical
value of the gross dividend.
In all the years 1988 to 2001, the estimated drop-oﬀ ratios for the cash
dividend and the franking credit were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other.
This result strongly suggests that analysis based on the estimation of a sin-
gle gross drop-oﬀ ratio is an inappropriate approach to understanding these
market phenomena.
An important extension to this ﬁnding is that in the years 1987 to 1997,
and in 2000, the impact of the franking credit on the ex-dividend day price
change was not signiﬁcantly greater than zero. This result suggests that
the market placed no value on franking credits during most of the sample
period, which is consistent with the ﬁndings of Bellamy and Gray (2004),
and, because investors undervalued franking credits, the gross drop-oﬀ ratios
are driven below one.
If marginal investors do not value the franking credit for most of the
sample, it is interesting to then focus on just the cash drop-oﬀ ratio. Under
the hypothesis that the market placed no value on franking credits, (4) can
be estimated assuming γ2 = 0, and then the cash drop-oﬀ ratio is estimated
by γ1. These results are shown in Table 4.
Observe that from 1990 to 1993, and from 1995 to 2004, the cash drop-oﬀ
ratio was not signiﬁcantly less than one. In all the other years the estimated
cash drop-oﬀ ratio was close to one in a qualitative sense, but the data allows
us to reject the null hypothesis that that cash drop-oﬀ ratio was exactly one.
This result is consistent with a variant of the short-term trading hypothesis
that arbitrageurs extracted most of the value in the potential cash (non-tax)
arbitrage.
4.2 Impact of Tax Regime Changes
One lesson from the previous section is that the valuation of franking credits
appears to have changed with time. In this section we examine more carefully
the notion of structural breaks arising as consequences of the tax regime
changes reviewed in Appendix A. The discussion will focus around the test
statistics reported in Table 5, for gross drop-oﬀ ratios, and Table 6, for
franking credit drop-oﬀ ratios.
Tax Change 1988 The tax change in 1988 was expected to increase both
the estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratio and the value of franking credits. Empirical
results indicate that both the gross drop-oﬀ ratio and the franking credit
drop oﬀ ratio fell from 1988 to 1989. However, comparing longer term trendsMarket Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 14
Table 4: Estimated Cash Drop-oﬀ Ratios Given γ2 = 0
Year Ended All Dividends




















* indicates that γ1 is signiﬁcantly less than unity at the 5% level.
in the drop-oﬀ ratios we see that, on average, the gross drop-oﬀ ratio was
signiﬁcantly larger over the 1989–1990 period than it was over the 1986–1988
period, whereas there was no statistically discernable diﬀerence between the
average franking credit drop-oﬀ ratios over the two periods. This implies
that the tax regime change had a signiﬁcant impact on the gross-drop oﬀ
ratio, but not on the value of franking credits. This is consistent with the
results observed by Brown and Clarke (1993).
Tax Change 1990 The 1990 tax change lead to the prediction that after
July 1990, both the gross drop-oﬀ ratio and the franking credit drop-oﬀ ratio
would decrease. Indeed this result was observed, however, tests suggest these
changes were not statistically signiﬁcant.
Tax Change 1991 After July 1991, the gross drop-oﬀ ratio and the frank-
ing credit drop-oﬀ ratio were predicted to fall. The empirical results show
that the estimated drop-oﬀ ratio initially fell in 1992, as the theory predicts,
but bounced around in the subsequent years. The estimated franking credit
drop-oﬀ ratio followed a similar path, falling in 1992, but moving up andMarket Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 15
Table 5: Tests for Structural Breaks in Gross Drop-oﬀ Ratios
Tax Period Estimated Null Hypothesis p-value
Regime Gross Drop-oﬀ
Ratio∗ (β1,j)
1 1986–1988 0.466 β1,1 = β1,2 = ... = β1,7 0.000
(0.034)
2 1989–1990 0.564 β1,1 = β1,2 0.011
(0.025)
3 1991 0.613 β1,2 = β1,3 0.231
(0.035)
4 1992–1997 0.617 β1,3 = β1,4 0.918
(0.015)
5 1998–1999 0.654 β1,4 = β1,5 0.112
(0.021)
6 2000 0.743 β1,5 = β1,6 0.008
(0.028)
7 2001–2004 0.724 β1,6 = β1,7 0.512
(0.013)
∗ The numbers in parentheses are estimated standard errors and the p-values are from
conventional F-tests of the hypotheses.
down in the following years.
Although the behaviour after 1992 appears inconsistent with the theory,
there are other reasons why such results might be expected. As discussed
in Appendix A, up until July 2000, investment returns of institutional in-
vestors signiﬁcantly aﬀected the market value of franking credits. Before tax
refunds for unused franking credits were made available in 2000, investors
receiving franking credits in excess of their tax payable could get no value
for the unused franking credit. Hence, in years when the investment returns
of large institutional investors were low, the tax liability of these institu-
tional investors would be small or even negative, thus the value of (marginal)
franking credits to these investors should have been zero. Similarly, when the
investment returns of large institutional investors were high, the tax liability
of these investors should have increased, hence the value of franking credits
to these investors should have been large. Since institutional investors such
as superannuation funds are big enough to inﬂuence market prices, it follows
that the market value of franking credits, and therefore the franking credit
drop-oﬀ ratio, will be inﬂuenced by the tax position of these institutional
investors.
The investment market suﬀered considerable losses in the recession years


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Market Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 17
turns to large institutional investors were low during the early 1990s, franking
credit drop-oﬀ ratios are expected to be low in this period. The investment
market began to recover in the middle 1990’s, and therefore the franking
credit drop-oﬀ ratio should increase in this period. There is some mild evi-
dence of this behaviour in the pattern of observed estimates of γ2. Franking
credit drop-oﬀ ratios fell considerably in the years 1991 and 1992, and then
slowly began to increase. However, the franking credit drop-oﬀ ratio was not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero during the period 1992-1997, and a test for
structural break between 1991 and 1992-1997 suggests that changes in the
estimated franking credit drop-oﬀ ratio were not statistically signiﬁcant.
Tax Change 1997 After June 1997, both the estimated franking credit
drop-oﬀ ratio and the estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratio were expected to fall.
The estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratios increased in both 1998 and 1999, while the
estimated franking credit drop-oﬀ ratio increased in 1998 and fell in 1999.
Although these results do not agree with the theory, they are consistent
with Bellamy and Gray (2004) who also observed an increase in the value of
franking credits after 30 June 1997. But as mentioned earlier, the two year
legislative delay in implementing the June 1997 tax regime changes resulted
in considerable uncertainty about the ﬁnal form of the law. This delay likely
muted the impact of the structural break so that the impact in any one
given year is probably not large enough to detect. Tests for structural breaks
between the periods 1992-1997 and 1998-1999 show that the estimated gross
drop-oﬀ ratios and estimated franking credit drop-oﬀ ratios did not change
signiﬁcantly.
Tax Change 1999 The 1999 tax change lead to a prediction that the
estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratio would decrease in 2000. Results show that the
estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratio did decrease, falling from 0.7 in 1999 to 0.6 in
2000, which is consistent with the developed theory. However, the test for a
structural break between 1998-1999 and 2000 suggests that the gross-drop-oﬀ
ratio actually increased in 2000, which is inconsistent with the theory.
Tax Change 2000 Finally, it was predicted that the 2000 tax change
would cause an increase in both the estimated franking credit drop-oﬀ ratio
and estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratio after July 2000. The estimated franking
credit drop-oﬀ ratio increased in 2001 and 2002, which is consistent with the
theory. A slight downward trend is noticed in 2003 and 2004. However, it
appears that this tax change had a permanent positive impact on the value
of franking credits. This result is conﬁrmed with a test for structural breaks
between 1998-2000 and 2001-2004. The test shows that the franking credit
drop-oﬀ ratio was signiﬁcantly higher in 2001 to 2004. Estimates of the
gross drop-oﬀ ratios show a similar pattern. The estimated gross drop-oﬀ
ratios increased in 2001 and 2002, but dropped slightly in 2003 and 2004.Market Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 18
However, tests for structural breaks suggest that the gross drop-oﬀ ratio was
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between 2000 and 2001-2004.
These results add strength to the argument that because investors did
not value excess franking credits before the tax change in 2000, franking
credits were signiﬁcantly undervalued, and estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratios
were relatively low. It follows that because investors could extract more
value from franking credits after the tax change in 2000, both the franking
credit drop-oﬀ ratio and the gross drop-oﬀ ratio permanently increased.
This ﬁnal result, combined with the conclusions from Section 4.1, has
an important practical interpretation. It suggests that the most recent tax
regime change, that ﬁnally allowed a tax rebate on unused franking credits,
signiﬁcantly increased the value of franking credits to the marginal investor.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyses the ex-dividend behaviour of share prices in the Aus-
tralian market from 1986 to 2004. We estimate the gross drop-oﬀ ratios, cash
drop-oﬀ ratios and franking credit drop-oﬀ ratios, and considers how these
ratios changed in response to changes in the tax regime.
Consistent with much of the literature, the empirical ﬁndings show that
the gross drop-oﬀ ratios were signiﬁcantly less than one over the entire sam-
ple period. This provided evidence that marginal investors in the form of
arbitrageurs did not trade up to the theoretical value of the gross dividend.
It was then found that cash drop-oﬀ ratios were consistently close to one,
but the franking credit drop-oﬀ ratios were signiﬁcantly less than one. More-
over, the franking credit drop-oﬀ ratios were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero for much of the sample data. This indicated that marginal investors did
not value the franking credit, and provided an explanation as to why gross
drop-oﬀ ratios less than one were observed.
The impacts of six tax regime changes were then considered. The eﬀects
of tax changes were found to be generally consistent with developed theory,
but few statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects could be identiﬁed for most of the tax
changes. Importantly, the year 2000 tax change that allowed for a tax rebate
of unused franking credits was of special interest. This tax regime change
permanently increased the value of franking credits to the marginal investor,
and raised the estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratio. Remembering that the govern-
ment introduced the dividend imputation system to remove the distortional
eﬀects of double taxation, this tax change resulted in more eﬃcient mar-
ket pricing mechanisms because it ﬁnally allowed the marginal investors to
extract a substantial component of the beneﬁt of the franking credit.Market Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 19
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A Changes to the Dividend Imputation Sys-
tem: Australia 1988–2000
1988 In July 1988, superannuation funds, selected deposit funds, and friendly
societies were for the ﬁrst time required to pay income and capital gains taxes
at a rate of 15 percent. To oﬀset this impost, these three classes of investor
also became eligible to use the franking credits system.11 In addition, insur-
ance funds of life assurance companies also became eligible to use the franking
credits system. Since superannuation funds became for the ﬁrst time liable
for income tax and their tax liability could be reduced with franking credits,
the prediction is that their demand for franking credits would rise. Similarly,
insurance funds could now use franking credits to reduce their tax liability. In
summary, both the gross drop-oﬀ ratio, β1, and the franking credit drop-oﬀ
ratio, γ2, should have increased after July 1988.
1990 In 1990, taxation laws were introduced to stop companies allocating
franking credits to those classes of shareholders who put the most values
on franking credits. These so-called ‘dividend streaming’ provisions stopped
companies issuing two classes of shares, one paying franked dividends and the
other paying unfranked dividends. Under these streaming schemes, investors
with low tax liability in Australia such as foreign investors or certain domestic
institutions were given shares paying a higher cash dividend, but with no
attached franking credits. Other amendments disallowed the use of franking
debits that arose when companies bought back their own shares. Together
these amendments further reduced the ability of investors to extract the full
value of franking credits. Therefore after July 1990, both the gross drop-oﬀ
ratio, β1, and the franking credit drop-oﬀ ratio, γ2, should have decreased.
1991 In August 1991, taxation laws were introduced that eﬀectively ex-
cluded mutual life assurance companies from the dividend imputation pro-
visions. These changes also provided for reduced franking credits and debits
for non-mutual life assurance companies.12 Also, additional provisions were
enacted to exclude friendly societies and other registered organizations from
the imputation system. As a result, both the gross drop-oﬀ ratio, β1, and the
franking credit drop-oﬀ ratio, γ2, should have decreased after 30 June 1991.
1997 In May 1997, the Government announced two sets of measures to
limit the use of franking credits. One set of measures that was made eﬀective
immediately, but not enacted until 1999, prevented franking credit trading
by foreign companies or exempt entities.13 These measures are known as
the related payments rule. In a simpliﬁed example of such a transaction,
11Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 2) (1989).
12Taxation Law Amendment Act (1991).
13Taxation Law Amendment Act (No 2) (1999).Market Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 22
an Australian investor borrows stock from a foreign investor and pays a
borrowing fee. The borrowing fee incorporates a cost of funds, being forgone
dividend income, plus a premium that eﬀectively transfers part of the tax
beneﬁt of the domestic borrower back to the foreign investor.
The second set of measures was made eﬀective from July 1997, but also
not enacted until 1999. Known as the holding period rule, these measures
required that traders hold a share for 45 days around the ex-dividend date
in order to gain entitlement to the franking credit. The holding period rule
stopped investors from trading around the ex-dividend for the sole purpose
of obtaining franking credits. Additional measures stipulated that upon re-
ceiving the franking credit, the investors could not fully hedge away their
exposure to market risk. Investors seeking to claim franking credit had to re-
main at least 30 percent exposed to movements in the value of the underlying
stock. This requirement is known as the 30 percent delta rule.
Both measures introduced in May 1997 reduced the capacity of important
classes of investors to use franking credits, and so it should be expected that
the demand for franking credits fell. Although these tax changes should have
impacted the market from July 1997, there are reasons why the initial impact
might have been small. Legislation supporting these tax changes was retro-
spective law, and was not enacted until two years after the announcement.
The exact scope of the legislation was not known for a long while and there
were technical diﬃculties deciding how the concept of a 30 percent delta rule
was to be measured. However, the proposition that both β1 and γ2 should
be smaller after 30 June 1997 can be examined.
1999 The most notable changes in capital gains tax laws occurred in Septem-
ber 1999, but were made eﬀective from July 1999. Capital gains tax rates
were signiﬁcantly reduced for individuals and superannuation funds. The
capital gains tax for individuals was reduced from a maximum of 47 percent
to no more than 24.45 percent, and capital gains tax for superannuation funds
was reduced from 15 percent to 10 percent. Against these beneﬁts, price
indexation for capital gains was frozen as of 30 September 1999.14 These
changes had the eﬀect of signiﬁcantly increasing the value of capital gains
relative to dividends, thus the gross drop-oﬀ ratio, β1, should have decreased.
2000 In July 2000, individuals and superannuation funds became entitled
to a tax refund for their excess or unused franking credits. Previously, when
an individual or superannuation fund received franking credits above their
payable tax, they were not entitled to any beneﬁt from unusable credits.
14Capital assets purchased before 30 September 1999 and held for one year remained
subject to indexation discounting, while any capital assets purchased after 30 September
1999 and held for 1 year became subject to the new discounting method. The new dis-
counting method stated that for assets purchased after 30 September 1999, individuals
paid capital gains tax on 50 percent of the gain, and superannuation funds paid tax on
66.6 percent of the gain.Market Arbitrage of Cash Dividends and Franking Credits 23
While it seems likely that most personal investors would have been using
their available franking credits, it is well known that many superannuation
funds did not pay tax because they had excess franking credits. The July 2000
changes created real value in previously unused franking credits, creating an
incentive for this large class of investors to actively seek franking credits. It is
easy to see that this regime change should have increased the franking credit
drop-oﬀ ratio, γ2, and thus increased the estimated gross drop-oﬀ ratio, β1.
B The Data
Data are for companies and trusts whose primary listing is on the Australian
Stock Exchange. The data set has been ﬁltered to remove all observations
where the dividend payment, the corporate tax rate, the cum-dividend share
price or the ex-dividend share price was not known. In practice, this ﬁlter
removed only a small number of observations. Those observations that were
removed had no unifying feature other than the missing data. It follows that
this ﬁlter should have no signiﬁcant impact on the estimation and results.
A second ﬁlter eliminated all cases where the market capitalization of a
company was not reported, or where the weight of market capitalization in
the All Ordinaries index was less that 0.03 percent.15
It has been shown that the results of ex-dividend day studies are very sen-
sitive to company events occurring close to the ex-dividend day.16 Following
Brown and Clarke (1993), the data set was screened for any companies that
changed their basis for quotation within 5 days either side of the ex-dividend
day. Special dividend payments were also removed. Special dividends are an
irregular distribution of excess cash reserves, and for this reason it is expected
that prices may act behave inconsistently around special dividend payments.
Finally, data from the extremely volatile month of October 1987 was
removed. The history of the Australian share market suggests that price
volatility in that month was the highest measured over the past 100 years.
The presence of the October 1987 data in this sample could distort interpre-
tation of results. After sorting, the data set contains 5511 ordinary dividend
events from 1 April 1986 to 10 May 2004. Descriptive statistics are presented
in Table 7.
In Section 4.1 we estimate gross drop-oﬀ ratios on the basis of various
sub-samples of the data. The sizes of each of these sub-samples are given in
Table 8.
15Although market capitalization alone is not critical to the analysis, companies with
very small market capitalizations tend to be rarely traded on the stock exchange. Therefore
the market pricing mechanisms for ﬁrms with small market capitalizations are not eﬃcient,
and the price changes on the ex-dividend date will be an unreliable measure of true scarcity.
The cut-oﬀ ﬁgure of 0.03 was suggested by Andrew Poppenbeck, the manager of CommSec
Share Portfolio Database.
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Table 8: Sub-sample Sizes for Estimated Drop-Oﬀ Ratios
Year Ended Franked Unfranked All
30 June Dividends Dividends Dividends
1986 0 336 336
1987 4 310 314
1988 160 100 260
1989 199 101 300
1990 177 69 246
1991 186 50 236
1992 182 43 225
1993 199 64 263
1994 208 64 272
1995 216 76 292
1996 218 85 303
1997 229 85 314
1998 230 72 302
1999 192 79 271
2000 189 78 267
2001 219 68 287
2002 229 70 299
2003 318 100 418
2004 232 74 306
Total 3587 1924 5511